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Preface
In the 2006-07 term, the U.S. Supreme Court gave us a ood
of new thought on the topic of environmental law.
Too bad.
1. Clean Water Act
The high court closed out the 2005-06 term with its ruling in
Rapanos v. United States.1 The plurality opinion of four Justices
(written by Scalia, J. and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito) begins with a spasm of skepticism
about ‘‘the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use’’
under the authority of an ‘‘enlightened despot’’ known to most of
us as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.2 In this story, there are
no beneciaries of wetlands regulation. None are mentioned,
none acknowledged. The violator, Mr. Rapanos, is entirely a
victim—facing 63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of
dollars in criminal and civil nes for the simple deed of ‘‘backlling his own wet elds.’’3
Mr. Justice Scalia's determined pursuit of his dialectical
hydrology would drive ‘‘intermittent’’ or ‘‘ephemeral’’ ows (and
thus many waters and prairie potholes throughout the arid west)
from the protective cover of ‘‘the waters of the United States.’’ He
would do this by adding his weighty opinion on ‘‘common understanding’’4 to Webster's dictionary5 to arrive at a disdainful
conclusion: ‘‘The plain language of the statute simply does not
authorize this ‘Land is Waters’ approach.’’6
Having redened hydrology, Mr. Justice Scalia turns next to
gravity. Science, for this man, is ‘‘entirely unnecessary . . . to
reach the unremarkable conclusion that the deposit of mobile pollutants into upstream ephemeral channels is naturally described
as an ‘addition . . . to navigable waters’ . . ., while the deposit of
1
Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 126
S. Ct. 2208, 165 L. Ed. 2d 159 (2006).
2
Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715,
722, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2215, 165 L. Ed.
2d 159 (2006)), citing Sunding & Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An
Assessment of Recent Changes to the
Wetland Permitting Process, 42 Nat.
Res. J. 59, 74-76 (2002).
3
Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 126

S. Ct. 2208, 2215, 165 L. Ed. 2d 159
(2006).
4
Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 126
S. Ct 2208, 2222, 165 L. Ed. 2d 159
(2006).
5
Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 126
S. Ct. 2208, 2228, 165 L. Ed. 2d 159
(2006).
6
Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 126
S. Ct. 2208, 2220-21, 165 L. Ed. 2d 159
(2006) (footnotes omitted).
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stationary ll material generally is not.’’ 7 Gravity is left to
wondering whether it can bring ‘‘stationary’’ material
downstream.8
The fth vote in Rapanos (that of Mr. Justice Kennedy) would
make the question of ‘‘navigable waters’’ turn on whether ‘‘a water or wetland [possesses] a ‘signicant nexus’ to waters that are
or were navigable in fact or that reasonably could be so made.’’9
This has the virtue of leaving ‘‘navigable waters’’ under the cover
of legal mystery (where they have been since SWANCC).10 It has
the twin vices of high transaction costs (the geneology of the
creek is always at issue) and of turning back the inquiry to the
ancient days where imagined navigability was a relevant
question. In the 1972 denition of ‘‘navigable waters,’’ Congress
intended to do away with both inquiries. It sought to achieve its
‘‘maximum’’ Constitutional reach 1 1 under the commerce
clause—an idea ignored and denied by the SWANCC majority
and by now long forgotten.
2. Superfund Law
In 2004, the Supreme Court held in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Aviall Services, Inc.12 that private parties could seek contribution
under Subsection 113(f) of CERCLA only after they had been
sued under § 106 or § 107(a). A dreadful decision. It contradicted
twenty-ve years of environmental agencies' advising private
parties to be ‘‘proactive,’’ to do ‘‘the right thing,’’ to ‘‘get ahead of
the curve,’’ to clean up on their own initiative, and to be creative
without the heavy hand of a government lawsuit.
Cooper Industries taught all private lawyers that no good
deed goes unpunished.
In 2007, a unanimous Supreme Court held in United States v.
Atlantic Research Corp.,13 that a private potentially responsible
party (PRP) can sue for contribution under Subsection 107(a).
Not Subsection 113(f). But Subsection 107(a). You will hold your
7

Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715,
745, n.11, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2228 n.11,
165 L. Ed. 2d 159 (2006) (emphasis
added).
8
See David R. Montgomery, Dirt:
The Erosion of Civilizations (U. Cal.
Press, Berkeley, 2007).
9
See Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715,
759, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236, 165 L. Ed.
2d 159 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment).
10
Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 121 S. Ct.
675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (2001).
iv

11

See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law: Air & Water, V.2,
§ 4.12 at 195-96, esp. 196 (1986, West,
St Paul, Minn.) (summarizing the
1972 legislative history conrming
‘‘the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation’’ and asserting a 1986
version of the state of the law: ‘‘courts
now universally perceive Section 404
as representing a maximum constitutional bite’’) (citations omitted).
12
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall
Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 125 S. Ct.
577, 160 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2004).
13
U.S. v. Atlantic Research Corp.,
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breath as Mr. Justice Thomas walks you through the plain meaning of this statute to the obvious conclusion.
So the carnage of Cooper Industries is limited to three years,
more or less. Is the decision in Atlantic Research Corp. a cause
for celebration? It's more like nding a lost dog that should not
have wandered away in the rst place.
3. Clean Air Act
Considerable contemporary attention will be given to the
Supreme Court's 5:4 decision in the ‘‘climate change’’ case—Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.14 For the court,
Mr. Justice Stevens holds that the State of Massachusetts has
standing to seek relief under the Clean Air Act to protect its territory from rising seas in the same sense that the state of Georgia could bring a lawsuit to defend against incoming SO2 from a
copper smelter.15 On the particular question of redressability, it
was enough that the prospect of a legal victory could alleviate the
injury if not fully prevent it.16
On the merits, the court holds that greenhouse gas emissions
(such as CO2) are ‘‘pollutants’’ under the Clean Air Act and that
the EPA has a duty to regulate ‘‘emissions’’ from new motor
vehicles upon a nding of ‘‘endangerment.’’17 Thus far, according
to the majority, EPA ‘‘has oered no reasoned explanation for its
refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to
climate change.’’18
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
JJs, dissents, insisting that the legal challenges are
‘‘nonjusticiable.’’19 He takes umbrage at the invocation of Tennes127 S. Ct. 2331, 168 L. Ed. 2d 28, 22
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 735 (2007).
14
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2007).
15
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1455 &n.17, 167 L. Ed. 2d
248 (2007) (discussing the famous
environmental case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907)).
16
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1458, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248
(2007) (‘‘While it may be true that
regulating motor-vehicle emissions
will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we
lack jurisdiction to decide whether
EPA has a duty to take steps to slow
or reduce it.’’) (emphasis in original).

17

See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127
S. Ct. 1438, 1454, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248
(2007), discussing Subsection 302(g),
42 U.S.C.A § 7602(g) (dening ‘‘air pollutant’’) and Subsection 202(a)(1), 42
U.S.C.A § 7521(a)(1) (directing Administrator to regulate the ‘‘emission’’ of
‘‘any air pollutant’’ from any class of
‘‘new motor vehicles’’ upon a determination that it may ‘‘cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare’’).
18
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1463, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248
(2007).
19
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1464, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248
(2007).
v
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see Copper to develop a nontraditional role of standing.20 And he
shows how what he describes as ‘‘traditional standing’’ (dating
perhaps to the Lujan decision in 1992)21 creates a set of interlocking traps for would-be plaintis:22
Petitioners' reliance on Massachusetts's loss of coastal land as their
injury in fact for standing purposes creates insurmountable problems
for them with respect to causation and redressability.
....
Redressability is even more problematic. To the tenuous link between
petitioners’ alleged injury and the indeterminate fractional domestic
emissions at issue here, add the fact that petitioners cannot meaningfully predict what will come of the 80 percent of global greenhouse
gas emissions that originate outside the United States. ... [T]he domestic emissions at issue here may become an increasingly marginal
portion of global emissions, and any decreases produced by petitioners’ desired standards are likely to be overwhelmed many times over
by emissions increases elsewhere in the world.
....
Petitioners’ diculty in demonstrating causation and redressability
is not surprising given the evident mismatch between the source of
their alleged injury—catastrophic global warming—and the narrow
subject matter of the Clean Air Act provision at issue in this suit.
The mismatch suggests that petitioners’ true goal for this litigation
may be more symbolic than anything else.

The dissent concludes with a denunciation of the old SCRAP
standing case.23 Its choice of language would apply more ttingly
to the repudiations of SCRAP the high court has given us in the
last thirty years:24
Over time, SCRAP became emblematic not of the looseness of Article
III standing requirements, but of how utterly manipulable they are if
not taken seriously as a matter of judicial self-restraint. SCRAP
made standing seem a lawyer’s game, rather than a fundamental
limitation ensuring that courts function as courts and not intrude on
the politically accountable branches. Today’s decision is SCRAP for a
new generation.

Mr. Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Thomas and Alito, JJs), writes a separate dissent, giving won20
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1465, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248
(‘‘The Court has to go back a full
century in an attempt to justify its
novel standing rule, but even there it
comes up short.’’).
21
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L.
Ed. 2d 351 (1992).
22
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1468-70, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248
(2007).

vi

23
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), with
background in a book by Neil Thomas
Proto, To a High Court: The Tumult
and Choices that Led to United States
of America v. SCRAP (2006, Hamilton
Books, Lanham, Md.).
24
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1471, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248
(2007).
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drous and strange instruction on the meaning of ‘‘air pollutant,’’
‘‘air pollution,’’25 and the adequacy of EPA's reasons for wanting
no part of these petitions.
In Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.,26 the court
holds (with Justice Thomas concurring in part) that replacement
and redesign work to ‘‘extend the life of the units [at several of
Duke Power's coal-red power plants] and allow them to run longer each day’’27 were ‘‘major modications’’ that would require
PSD permits. The small legislative wrinkle that determined
advocacy made Supreme Court-worthy is that Congress used the
same term ‘‘modication’’28 in the 1970 New Source Performance
Standards (NSPSs) and then again in its 1977 upgrade of the
Prevention of Signicant Deterioration (PSD) program. Each
time, the idea was that if the ‘‘modication’’ gave us more ‘‘air
pollutants,’’ the sources would be answerable for them under the
NSPS and PSD programs, respectively.
Both programs have foundered, in no small part because
electric utilities have endeavored to extend the life of old plants
without running awry of the ‘‘modication’’ requirements. Dierent rules at dierent times dening ‘‘modication’’ (one set in
1975, another in 1980) invited the contestants to exploit
contradictions that arise in any complex system.29 Duke Power
convinced the Fourth Circuit that ‘‘modication’’ could only mean
one thing under the Clean Air Act and that one thing was that
the claimed increase in pollutants had to be measured by the
hourly rate used for NSPSs. Their adversaries (the U.S. and
environmental groups) said it was appropriate to look at ‘‘actual
25
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1477, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248
(2007):

EPA’s conception of ‘‘air pollution’’—focusing on impurities in
the ‘‘ambient air’’ ‘‘at ground
level or near the surface of the
earth’’—is perfectly consistent
with the natural meaning of
that term.
26

Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 295 (2007).
27
Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 295 (2007).
28
Dened in the 1970 Act (42
U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(4)):

any physical change in, or
change in the method of operation of, a stationary source
which increases the amount of
any air pollutant emitted by
such source or which results in
the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.
29
This was known from the earliest
days of the Clean Air Act. See W.H.
Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law: Air
& Water, V. 1, § 1.2 at 10 (1986, West,
St. Paul, Minn.) (‘‘courts have confronted the problems of complexity and
tangled obligation by developing a rule
of independency of process that permits function A to be pursued without
linking it to function B’’). Duke Power
does this.

vii
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annual discharge of a pollutant that will follow the modication,’’
regardless of the hourly rate.30
The Fourth Circuit ruled that Congress' use of identical statutory denitions could mean only that the conditions for a
‘‘modication’’ must be identical. This meant the single threshold
test would be whether the changes had eected an increase in
‘‘the rate of discharge of pollutants measured in kilograms per
hour.’’31 But the Supreme Court holds that ‘‘the Court of Appeals’s [sic] eorts to trim the PSD regulations to match their different NSPS counterparts can only be seen as an implicit declaration that the PSD regulations were invalid as written.’’32
From the opinions, it is a downright mystery why Duke Power
is arguing for an hourly rate (usually more stringent) and the
U.S. and the environmental groups are arguing for an annual
rate (usually less stringent). The brieng makes clear that the
NSPS ‘‘hourly emissions rate’’ standard is indierent to the time
of operation and the intensity of operation. Functionally, it would
permit a modernization project to increase an air pollutant emitted from a source by hundreds or thousands of tons per year.33
4. Clean Water Act/Endangered Species Act
In National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife,34 the Supreme Court holds (5:4) that the U.S. EPA was
not obliged to consult under Subsection 7(a)(2)35 as to likely effects on listed species resulting from its decision to approve
transfer of NPDES permitting authority to the State of Arizona.
Justice Alito's decision for the court reaches this result by reading the transfer provisions of § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act as
mandatory and nondiscretionary (‘‘shall approve’’; ‘‘By its terms,
the statutory language is mandatory and the list exclusive; if the
nine specied criteria are satised, the EPA does not have the
discretion to deny a transfer application.’’).36 On this premise,
then, Justice Alito describes the ‘‘question presented’’ as ‘‘whether
§ 7(a)(2) eectively operates as a tenth criterion on which the
30
Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1430,
167 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2007).
31
Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1430,
167 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2007).
32
Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1432,
167 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2007).
33
Sean H. Donahue et al., Brief for
the Petitioners, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp. (July
2006).

viii

34
National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2531, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007).
35
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2).
36
National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2531, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007).
Actually, the ‘‘mandatory’’ features of
state program delegation are teeming
with discretion. See W.H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Environmental Law: Air & Water, Vol.
2, § 4.26 at 376-80 (1986, West, St.
Paul, Minn.). The dissent of Mr. Jus-
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transfer of permitting power under the rst statute must be
conditioned.’’37
In concluding that ‘‘it does not,’’ the majority concedes that
the answer to the question ‘‘requires us to mediate a clash of
seemingly categorical—and, at rst glance, irreconcilable—
legislative commands.’’38 Approve an NPDES transfer application
if the nine criteria are met on the one hand. Consult on ‘‘any action authorized, funded or carried out’’ to avoid jeopardy to
endangered species on the other.39 The majority ‘‘reconciles’’ the
two statutes by holding that the mandatory ESA consultation
provisions apply only to ‘‘actions in which there is discretionary
Federal involvement or control.’’40 The majority has a story about
why the administrators earned deference on this point. The dissenters have a contrary story.41
A dreadful decision. Completely wrong.
This case is about complying with two statutes not one.
Indeed, the EPA in this very case thought it had a duty to consult
under the ESA and it did consult. It proudly announced in the
Federal Register that it had ‘‘conclude[d] the consultation process
required by ESA Section 7(a)(2).’’42 But Justice Alito patiently
explained that this was a ‘‘stray statement,’’ a mere administrative ‘‘dictum.’’43 Next time, to be sure, this agency will not be
caught complying with the Endangered Species Act.
tice Stevens is quite correct on this
point (Opinion, § I, National Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2539-41 (2007)).
Any State Attorney General imagining victory in the mandamus action
recommended by Mr. Justice Alito
would be met with full fusillades of
EPA ‘‘discretion.’’
37
National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2525, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007).
38
National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2531, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007).
39
Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act (16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2))
says:

‘‘[e]ach Federal agency shall, in
consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such

agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize’’ [endangered or threatened species or result in ‘‘destruction
or
adverse
modication’’ of critical habitat].
40
National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2533, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007)),
quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.03.
41
Compare National Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127
S. Ct. 2518, 2524, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467
(2007) (Alito opinion) with National
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2538, 168
L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007) (Stevens opinion).
42
Quoted in National Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127
S. Ct. 2518, 2530, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467
(2007).
43
National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2530, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007).
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The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens shows how easy
it would be for the EPA to comply with both laws.44 The agency
managed to do it here. More could be said. None of the opinions
cite § 7(a)(1)45 of the ESA, which says that all agencies ‘‘shall utilize’’ their authorities to advance the aims of protecting species.
EPA clearly could undertake this consultation if it so desired.
None of the opinions cite § 105 of the National Environmental
Policy Act,46 which says that environmental goals are ‘‘supplementary’’ to ‘‘existing authorizations.’’ This requires consultation
for reasons mentioned in a separate dissent by Mr. Justice
Breyer.47 None of the opinions cite the three Supreme Court NEPA
decisions that establish the ‘‘comply-unless-impossible’’ test that
should have been applied here.48
Justice Alito looks no farther than the sorry precedent of
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen.49 Agencies are
now invited to scramble to avoid compliance with environmental
laws by discovering compulsion under other mandates more suitable to their temperaments and politics. Will Calvert Clis50 be
forever lost to a clumsy performance such as this?
Appreciation is expressed to my secretary, word processor,
graphic design expert, and helper, Cynthia Fester; and to my
second-to-none librarians (among them Peggy Jarrett, Cheryl
Nyberg, Mary Whisner, Ann E. Hemmens and Nancy McMurrer)
who work with Professor Penny Hazelton at the University of
Washington School of Law's Marian Gould Gallagher Law
Library.
William H. Rodgers, Jr.
Stimson Bullitt Professor
of Environmental Law
44
National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2538, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007)
(joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer).
45
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(1).
46
42 U.S.C.A. § 4335.
47
National Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518, 2553, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (the ‘‘shared
purpose’’ of the Clean Water Act and
the Endangered Species Act ‘‘shows
that § 7(a)(2) must apply to the Clean
Water Act a fortiori’’).
48
Flint Ridge Development Co. v.
Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Oklahoma, 426
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U.S. 776, 778, 96 S. Ct. 2430, 49 L. Ed.
2d 205 (1976); Weinberger v. Catholic
Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project,
454 U.S. 139, 145-46, 102 S. Ct. 197,
70 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1981); Andrus v.
Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 362-63, 99
S. Ct. 2335, 60 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1979).
49
Department of Transp. v. Public
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 124 S. Ct. 2204,
159 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2004), discussed in
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Tenth
U.S. Supreme Court Justice (Crazy
Horse, J.) and Dissents Not Written,
34 ELR 11033, 11034 (2004).
50
Calvert Clis Coordinating Comm.
v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).

Preface

University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3020
June 2008

xi

